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Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
1. INTRODUCTION
In Teague v. Lane, ' the Supreme Court completed the fitful tran-
sition from a rule-based test to a process-based test for determining
the retroactivity of new rules of criminal procedure. 2 The Court
held that the retroactive application of constitutional guarantees of
criminal procedural rights, in this case the extension of the sixth
amendment fair cross section requirement to the petit jury, hinges
on the procedural posture of the defendants seeking the benefit of
the new rule.3 The Court formulated a test that focuses exclusively
on a defendant's place in the review process, and approved narrow
exceptions for new rules that affect conduct of a private nature or
that would likely lead to the reversal of a conviction. 4 Thus, the test
largely eliminated from consideration the factors that formerly lay at
the core of its approach: the purposes and effects of the specific
constitutional right involved. 5
This Note will argue that such a complete break with the previ-
ous retroactivity standard is unnecessary to achieve the objectives
I Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
2 In this context, the "retroactivity doctrine" is the Court's analytical framework for
deciding when a new rule of criminal procedure is to be applied to "prior" cases. Vari-
ous commentators have observed that several reference points are available for defining
a "prior" case: the point at which a conviction becomes final, the date of the commence-
ment of trial, or the date of the violation of constitutional procedure. The Court has
used all three reference points, and even a fourth (the date of introduction of illegally
obtained evidence) in fourth amendment cases, without articulating a reasoned basis for
its choices. See Note, United States v. Johnson: Reformulating the Retroactivity Doctrine, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 166, 167 n.8 (1983).
3 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069.
4 Id. at 1075-77.
5 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 636 (1965).
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sought by the Court. The Court's practical interest in finality will be
accepted here as a legitimate concern, though studies documenting
the impact of pure retroactivity are lacking.6 Yet the Court could
adequately address its pragmatic concern without eliminating the
safeguards of fundamental fairness that come from examining the
nature and purposes of proposed rules. This Note suggests the
framework of a test that would allow the Court to accommodate in-
terests of finality and concerns for fundamental fairness.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 1979, Frank Dean Teague, a black man, was con-
victed by ajury composed exclusively of white jurors7 on two counts
of armed robbery, one count of aggravated battery, and three
counts of attempted murder for his involvement in the robbery of a
grocery store and subsequent shooting of police officers. 8 He was
convicted on each count and was sentenced to serve concurrent
thirty-year prison terms. 9
During jury selection for trial, the prosecution used all ten per-
emptory challenges allotted to it to strike black members of the ve-
nire from the petit jury.' 0 Teague's counsel first objected to the
prosecutor's use of such challenges after the prosecutor had elimi-
nated six potential black jurors; counsel then moved for a mistrial. I
The court denied Teague's motion, asserting that a motion at that
point was improper. 12 Once the jury selection process had been
completed, Teague's counsel again moved for a mistrial, objecting
that his client was being denied "a jury of his peers." 13
The prosecutor responded to Teague's objection by volunteer-
6 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
7 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1065.
8 Id. at 1065.
9 People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 893, 439 N.E.2d 1066, 1068 (1982).
10 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1065.
11 United States ex rel. Teague v. Lane, 779 F.2d 1332, 1333 (7th Cir. 1985). See infra
note 12 and accompanying text.
12 Joint Appendix at 2-3, Teague (No. 87-5259).
13 Id. at 3. The relevant exchange between the court and counsels took place as
follows:
Mr. Motta [Counsel for the defendant]: As the Court is aware State exercised
10 peremptory challenges and each challenge excused a black person. I feel that my
client is entitled to a jury of his peers, your Honor. I feel that he is being denied
this. I would ask the Court for a mistrial.
Mr. Angarola [Prosecutor]: We exercised more than 10 challenges. In fact we
exercised 11 challenges and didn't just excuse black individuals. Counsel is incor-
rect when he stats [sic] that.
In fact, your Honor, one of the challenges, peremptory challenges exercised
was against a white woman. In addition, your Honor, numerous individuals that
were excused were of very young years. There was an attempt, your Honor, to have
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ing the justification that he was attempting to eliminate very young
jurors and to create a balance of men and women. 14 Without di-
rectly commenting on the validity of these reasons, the court denied
Teague's second request for a mistrial and observed that the jury
selected "appear[ed] to be a fair jury."'15
Teague appealed his conviction on the ground that the manner
in which the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges vio-
lated his right to an impartial jury.' 6 The appellate court rejected
Teague's sixth amendment claim and affirmed the district court's
decision. 17 Teague's appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was de-
nied, 18 as was his subsequent petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. 19
In March 1984, five months after the denial of certiorari and
more than four years after his conviction, Teague filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. 20 The State of Illinois answered with a
a balance of an equal number of men and women as the jury is now comprised there
are seven men and five women sitting on the jury.
We feel that counsel's motion is totally improper.
Mr. Motta: If I may respond to that briefly, your Honor, State exercised 10
peremptory challenges, all of 10 black people were excused; that their one peremp-
tory challenge for an alternate juror excused, I believe, a white woman. I think the
record will reflect the ages and background of the individuals that were excused.
They were all to sit on the regularjury. I am not talking about the alternate, the one
white alternate that was excused by the State.
Mr. Angarola: As your Honor previously pointed out, counsel himself ex-
cluded a black, Mrs. McCleary, your Honor, who was a black individual who was
accepted by the People, and he excused her.
The Court: Counsel, I feel that it would appear that the jury appears to be a
fair jury. I will deny your motion.
Id. at 3-4.
14 Teague, 779 F.2d at 1333.
15 Teague v. Lane, 820 F.2d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 1987). See supra note 13.
16 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1065.
17 Teague v. Lane, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 439 N.E.2d 1066 (1982).
18 People v. Teague, 93 Ill. 2d 547, 449 N.E.2d 820 (1983).
19 Teague v. Lane, 464 U.S. 867 (1983).
20 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1065. The sections of the United States Code authorizing a
petition for the writ provide in pertinent part:
§ 2241. Power to grant writ.
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless ...
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States ....
§ 2254. State custody; remedies in Federal courts.
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
1130 [Vol. 80
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motion for summary judgment, relying upon the standard set out in
Swain v. Alabama.21 Teague asserted that the prosecutor's use of all
of his peremptory challenges to eliminate black venire members was
a violation of his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury and his
fourteenth amendment right to due process. 22 He based his four-
teenth amendment argument on the claim that the Supreme Court
had effectively discredited 23 the Swain requirement-a showing of a
systematic pattern of discriminatory acts by the prosecutor in re-
peated cases24-in McCray v. New York. 25 The district court did not
review the validity of Teague's argument, holding instead that it was
bound by other precedent to deny the petition. 26
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States....
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, a
determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court
of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the
State or an officer or agent thereof were parties.., shall be presumed to be correct,
unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent
shall admit...
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not ade-
quate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing...
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding ....
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1988).
21 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The Swain Court held that a black defendant's rights to
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment were not violated by the prosecu-
tion's exercise of its peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury in the ab-
sence of systematic exclusion of blacks from juries over a period of time. Id. at 221-23.
22 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1065, 1067. The sixth amendment provides that "in all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
. ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
23 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1067.
24 See supra note 21.
25 461 U.S. 961 (1983). Although the Court denied certiorari in McCray, Justices
Marshall and Brennan filed dissents calling for review of Swain. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at
1067.
26 See Teague v. Lane, 820 F.2d 832, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1987) (summary of the district
court's unpublished order). The district court held that two Seventh Circuit decisions,
United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1984) (facts did not support inference of
racial discrimination), and United States ix rel. Palmer v. DeRobertis, 738 F.2d 168 (7th
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Teague appealed the denial of his petition on the same grounds
to the Seventh Circuit.2 7 A panel of the appellate court initially de-
termined that Teague had made out a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination under the "fair cross-section" standard of jury
impartiality guaranteed by the sixth amendment.28 The panel then
submitted its preliminary decision to the court en banc, which with-
held further consideration of the case pending the outcome of Bat-
son v. Kentucky. 29
In Batson, the Court held that a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
could be shown on the prosecutor's use of challenges in a single
case.30 The Court subsequently restricted the retroactive applica-
tion of Batson, however, to cases not brought on collateral review.3'
Relying on these decisions, the Court of Appeals denied Teague the
benefit of the Batson rule, dismissed his Swain claim on grounds of
procedural default, and held that the "fair cross section" rule ap-
plied only to the composition and selection of the jury venire. 32
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider three issues: 1) whether petitioner was in a position to benefit
from the new standards for establishing prima facie discrimination
injury selection set out in Batson; 2) whether petitioner could make
out a prima facie case of discrimination under the Swain standard
based on an examination of the justifications volunteered by the
prosecutor; and 3) whether Teague was entitled to a rule extending
the sixth amendment guarantee to a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community to the exercise of peremptory challenges
in selecting the petit jury.3 3 This Note will address only this last
issue.34
Cir. 1984) (convicted appellant defaulted by failing to explain or show prejudice from
failure to raise jury selection issue at trial), as well as Swain, precluded issuance of
Teague's petition.
27 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1066.
28 See United States ex rel. Teague v. Lane, 779 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1985) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting from order of full court vacating panel opinion and voting to rehear case en
banc).
29 779 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Following the decision in Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the en banc panel held that Teague was not entitled to the
benefit of that new rule because it had expressly been held non-retroactive in Allen v.
Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986). Teague, 820 F.2d at 832.
30 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
31 Allen, 478 U.S. at 255.
32 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1066.
33 Teague v. Lane, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
34 The plurality opinion of the Court quickly dispatched with the first two arguments.
Regarding the retroactive application of Batson, the Court held that Allen, 478 U.S. at
255, had previously determined that Batson was to be applied only prospectively in cases
[Vol. 801132
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III. THE RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE PRIOR TO TEAGUE
Before 1965, the Court followed a general practice of applying
new constitutional doctrine retroactively to all cases, whether heard
on direct or collateral review.35 The Court first attempted a com-
prehensive statement of its approach to the question of retroactivity
in Linkletter v. Walker.3 6 The Court argued that the view that judges
merely interpret immanent, existing law had lost its credibility over
the course of the previous century. 37 This view recognizes that law
evolves new rules and that there may be compelling reasons not to
disturb prior decisions in which courts had properly applied the
constitutional law in effect at the time.38 As a result, the Court as-
serted that the Constitution itself neither favored nor discouraged
retroactive application of new rules in any context.3 9 Although it
did not venture to formulate criteria for deciding when a new rule
had been "created," the Court emphasized that the interest in final-
ity as well as the improvements in fairness implicit in the promulga-
tion of new rules had to be factored into the retroactivity doctrine.
40
Thus, the Court fashioned a balancing test for retroactivity that
weighed three factors: "the purpose of the [new rule], the reliance
placed upon [the previous rule], and the effect on the administration
of justice of a retroactive application of the [new rule]." 4 1
However, the Linkletter Court itself provided no guidelines for
the uniform application of these factors. In Linkletter's case, the
Court asserted that the exclusionary rule had as its primary object
of collateral review. The Court noted that Teague's petition for certiorari had been
denied over two years earlier. It also held that its earlier denial of certiorari in McCray,
issued while Teague's case was on direct appeal, had no legal effect upon the previous
standard set forth in Swain. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1066-67 (citing McCray v. New York,
461 U.S. 961 (1983); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
On the petitioner's argument that the prosecutor's voluntary explanation permitted
a deeper examination of the use of challenges, the Court held that Teague had failed to
raise the issue below, thus waiving his claim. Habeas review was also barred to Teague,
the Court said, because he did not make the required showing that considerations of
fundamental fairness required that his failure to raise the issue be overlooked. Id. at
1067-69.
35 United States v.Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 (1982).
36 381 U.S. 618 (1965). The Linkletter Court was confronted with the habeas petition
of a man convicted of burglary on the basis of evidence obtained in warrantless searches
of his home. The Court had held previously that the searches were too distant from the
arrest to be held constitutional under the fourth amendment. Id. at 621 (citing Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
37 Id. at 623-24.
38 Id. at 624.
39 Id. at 629.





the deterrence of police misconduct during investigations; previous
misconduct could not be undone by retroactive application.42 Be-
cause the Linkletter Court defined the purpose of the exclusionary
rule in terms of whether it focused on the merits of the defendant's
case or on officer misconduct, it might have been expected that sub-
sequent cases would have recognized the distinction between cases
heard on direct and collateral review. However, the Linkletter Court
went no further in structuring its inquiry into the "purpose" of new
rules, nor did it address the problem of rules which shared both
deterrence and fact-finding objectives.
Instead, the silence of the Linkletter Court on these questions
led to creative use of the three Linkletter factors and expansive inter-
pretations of the purposes of new rules undeserving of retroactive
application. In Tehan v. Shott,43 the Court applied the Linkletter "pur-
pose" test to a case involving prosecutorial comment on a defend-
ant's decision to invoke the right to remain silent, and asserted that
the fifth amendment aims more at guaranteeing personal privacy
than at furthering the truth-finding process in court.44 Thus, the
Court held that the defendant was not entitled to retroactive appli-
cation of the new rule because the rule had no remedial purpose.45
The following year, in Johnson v. New Jersey,46 the Court rejected the
direct/collateral review distinction. The Johnson Court denied retro-
active application of the Miranda rule to a case brought on direct
appeal, despite the threat that evidence obtained during interroga-
tion would be misleading or inaccurate, because other means were
available to prevent admission of unreliable statements. 47 Both Te-
han and Johnson attempted to minimize the damaging impact of their
decisions on the fact-finding process by emphasizing that the trial
court did not violate ethical standards by applying the law in effect
at the time. 48
Following Tehan and Johnson, the Court continued to enlarge
the range of rules that did not warrant retroactive application.49
42 Id. at 636-37.
43 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
44 Id. at 416.
45 Id. at 413.
46 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
47 Id. at 730. The Court took a novel approach to its inquiry into the purpose of the
rule. While it acknowledged that at least one purpose of the rule against self-incrimina-
tion was to prevent police officers from extracting misleading or incriminating informa-
tion from a defendant without his awareness of his procedural rights, the Court
minimized the importance of this purpose by citing other methods available to the de-
fendant to contest the validity of the information he supplied. Id. at 729.
48 Tehan, 382 U.S. at 416-17;Johnson, 384 U.S. at 731.
49 See, e.g., Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (rule that use of peremptory chal-
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However, the inconsistent treatment of similarly situated defendants
led Justice Harlan to criticize the new approach. The result in John-
son prompted Justice Harlan to undertake a thorough review of the
Linkletter test.50 In the first of his dissents, Justice Harlan argued
that the appropriate focus of any inquiry into constitutional issues is
whether the defendant's case "require[s] their resolution for a just
adjudication on the merits."5 1 He then argued that the Constitution
demands that redress for a governmental violation of a constitu-
tional right be given to all defendants on direct review.52 Other-
wise, Justice Harlan observed, prospective application results in the
unequal treatment of defendants sharing the same procedural posi-
tion and gives judges unlimited discretion to apply law in contraven-
tion of the pre-eminent constitutional law.53
Justice Harlan recognized two distinct purposes of collateral re-
view: 1) ensuring the freedom of persons whose convictions were
potentially affected by errors in fact-finding; and 2) creating an "in-
centive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct
their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitu-
tional standards."-5 4 According to Justice Harlan, the focus in cases
heard on collateral review concerned not so much unequal treat-
ment, for collateral attack may be brought by a defendant at any
point before or after conviction, as the effect of a particular rule on
the integrity of the fact-finding process during trial.5 5 Therefore,
defendants on collateral review may be entitled to retroactive appli-
cation of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure not be-
cause they are indistinguishable from the defendant in the case'
announcing the new rule, but because their convictions may extend
beyond standards of tolerable unfairness. 56
Justice Harlan refined his views in Mackey v. United States.5 7 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Harlan affirmed the importance of final-
ity in deciding not to give new rules retroactive application to cases
lenges to strike members of a single race from jury held non-retroactive); Solem v.
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984) (rule that statements made by suspect who has requested
counsel are inadmissible unless he initiated them held non-retroactive); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (fourth amendment rule that fourth amendment search need
not involve physical intrusion held non-retroactive).
50 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist, 394
U.S. at 244 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51 Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 258-59 (Harlan; J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56 Id.
57 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
1135
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
on collateral review. 58 Justice Harlan also created two exceptions to
the general principle for 1) rules that invalidate proscriptions on
"primary, private individual conduct," 59 and 2) rules that affect pro-
cedural guarantees " 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "60
While providing a reasonably precise definition of the first excep-
tion, Justice Harlan defined the second in terms of the protection of
"bedrock procedural elements" to which all defendants are enti-
tled.6' Justice Harlan did not elaborate on the means of identifying
such elements in defining this exception, but did expressly reject his
earlier emphasis on improvements in the fact-finding process. 62
Despite Justice Harlan's invocations, the Court continued to ap-
ply the rule-based Linkletter standard. 63 However, the emphasis of
the Court's review of a new rule's purpose increasingly fell on the
rule's effect on the reliability of evidence instead of fact-finding pro-
cedures. This shift was due in part to development of the retroactiv-
ity doctrine in the context of the expansion of the scope of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule.64
During the mid-1970s, the Court began in isolated cases to re-
examine the Linkletter framework and to consider the advantages of
the procedural distinction urged by Justice Harlan. The first depar-
ture from Linkletter came in United States v. Peltier.6 5 In Peltier, the
Court acknowledged the applicability of the fourth amendment but
58 Id. at 682-83 (Harlan, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan equated rules affecting this con-
duct with recently developed principles of substantive due process, such as the right to
privacy. Id.; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan,J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). WhileJustice Harlan did not elaborate on what he meant by this
phrase, he did attribute such procedures to cases where "time and growth in social ca-
pacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory
process, will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that
must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction," id., and distinguished it
from any rules that "significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures." Id.
at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 693-94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
63 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. In subsequent cases, the Court usually
framed the test in terms of the statement of the three factors in Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
64 See, e.g., Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984) (rule of inadmissibility of a defend-
ant's answers given in response to questioning of police officers after the defendant
requested but did not receive a lawyer should not be given retroactive application be-
cause the accuracy of the conviction is affected but not seriously threatened). This
theme has been echoed by courts confronted with the issue of retroactivity of other
constitutional rules affecting pretrial procedures. See, e.g., Stovall, 388 U.S. at 293 (iden-
tification process in which defendant was presented to witness without being given op-
portunity to retain counsel was not a sufficiently serious threat to fairness).
65 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
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declined to exclude the unlawfully obtained evidence on the ground
that the rule's purpose was primarily deterrence of police miscon-
duct.66 By framing its inquiry in terms of the remedy, however, the
Court avoided the requirement, implicit in the Linkletter line of
cases, of determining if the rule actually broke with precedent. 67
The Court expressed a more profound disagreement with the Lin-
kietter approach in United States v. Johnson.68 In Johnson, the Court
declared that defendants on direct review were entitled to retroac-
tive application of new fourth amendment rules.6 9 The import of
the decision lay in the Court's substantial reliance on the general
principles of judicial integrity and equal treatment propounded by
Justice Harlan. While the Court expressly limited its holding to
fourth amendment cases, its method of analysis suggested a broader
application.
The Court finally re-evaluated the Linkletter standard by adopt-
ing Justice Harlan's approach to cases on direct review in Griffith v.
Kentucky. 70 The Court held that the interest in observing current law
warranted retroactive application of new constitutional rules to all
cases on direct review "regardless of the specific characteristics of
the particular new rule announced." 71 The Court looked exclu-
sively at the positions of the parties involved and the effect their
disparate treatment would have on judicial integrity, rather than at
the nature of the constitutional provision involved.72 The Griffith
decision left an opening for the Court to reconsider the standard in
its entirety.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE PLURALITY OPINION
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for a plurality of the Teague
Court.73 While acknowledging that the key substantive issue raised
by the case was the extension of the sixth amendment fair cross sec-
66 Id. at 542.
67 See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
68 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
69 Id. at 562.
70 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
71 Id. at 326.
72 Id. at 320-26.
73 Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). Justice O'Connor wrote for a majority of
the Court with respect to the first two issues admitted on certiorari. See supra note 33
and accompanying text. Her opinion with respect to the issue discussed here was joined
by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1060.
Justice White concurred only in the judgment. Id.
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tion requirement to petit jury selection,7 4 Justice O'Connor began
her opinion with a review of the place occupied by the Court's retro-
activity doctrine in cases announcing new rules.75  Justice
O'Connor's review revealed that the Court has occasionally ad-
dressed the retroactivity question in the case announcing a new rule,
and at other times has left the issue to be decided in later cases. 76
Arguing that any delay in deciding retroactivity threatens to treat
the defendant in the case announcing the rule differently from
others in the same position, Justice O'Connor held that the question
must be decided at the outset of any case that could produce a new
rule.77 Under the plurality approach, if retroactivity is found not to
be justified, concerns for equal treatment of defendants should su-
persede and prevent consideration of the defendant's substantive
claims. 78
Continuing on this theme, the plurality opinion presented a
critical history of the practical effects of the retroactivity standard
first set out in Linkletter.79 LikeJustice Harlan, Justice O'Connor was
especially concerned with the result compelled by Linkletter in cases
like United States v. Johnson,80 where defendants on direct review are
denied the benefits of admittedly constitutional law. 8' Justice
O'Connor noted that the Court had resolved this discrepancy in
Griffith by approving retroactive application of new rules to all cases
still on direct review.82 Justice O'Connor noted, however, that the
74 Id. at 1065.
7-5 Id. at 1069.
76 Id. Those cases cited by Justice O'Connor as taking the latter approach include
the following: Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) (addressing retroactivity of
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979)); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973) (ad-
dressing retroactivity of Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970)); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967) (addressing retroactivity of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967),
and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966)
(addressing retroactivity of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)). The cases in
which the Court announced a new rule and decided its retroactivity are Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
77 Id. at 1069-70. Justice O'Connor defined a new rule as the principle arising from a
case where "the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final." Id. at 1070 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan later took
issue with this potentially problematic definition, id. at 1087-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
but the determination of an appropriate definition is beyond the scope of this Note.
78 Id. at 1070.
79 Id. at 1070-71 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)). See supra notes
36-48 and accompanying text for discussion of Linkletter.
80 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
81 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1071.
82 Id. at 1071 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)). Justice
O'Connor advanced two reasons in support of this rule: 1) a court that denies a defend-
ant on direct review the application of current constitutional law usurps legislative
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Court had yet to deal with Linkletter's disparate treatment of similarly
situated defendants on collateral review.83
The plurality held that these problems stemmed from the Lin-
kletter Court's misunderstanding of the distinct "nature and function
of collateral review." 8 4 It asserted that these defendants stand in a
fundamentally different procedural position in the eyes of the court
because habeas corpus does not entitle them to a review of the mer-
its of their cases. 85 Rather, the opinion concludes, collateral reme-
dies are designed to ensure that trial and appellate judges properly
adhere to constitutional principles.86 The plurality contended that
other cases decided by the Court had recognized the significance of
this distinction, especially noting that a grant of habeas corpus relies
on "interests of comity and finality" as well as protection of individ-
ual rights.87 Furthermore, the plurality contended that the Court
had never articulated a consistent policy on the purposes of habeas,
but that it had recently affirmed its commitment to finality in several
cases.
88
Having accepted the essential distinction of the Harlan test, the
plurality addressed the scope of the permitted exceptions. 89 Justice
O'Connor determined that the first exception did not apply as
Teague's case did not involve "any primary activity whatsoever." 90
Justice O'Connor then concluded that the second exception for pro-
cedures "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" should be lim-
ited to "watershed" rules of criminal procedure.9' The plurality
noted that Justice Harlan, while concerned about procedures
"creat[ing] an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be con-
victed," 92 expressed reservations about defining the exception
solely in terms of rules that "significantly improve the pre-existing
power; and 2) defendants on direct review are in the same factual and procedural
position.
83 Id. at 1072.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1073-74 (citing Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984), and Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
86 Id. at 1073.
87 Id. (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977)). In Wainwright, the
Court denied a habeas petition to a defendant who failed to rebut a presumption that he
had been given an opportunity to raise his claim under a rule existing at the time he
stood trial, but had instead defaulted on the claim. 433 U.S. at 91.
88 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1074.
89 Id. at 1075-77. See supra note 59-60 and accompanying text.
90 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1075.
91 Id. at 1075. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.





The plurality argued that it would be possible to meet both con-
cerns by utilizing a standard that would grant retroactive application
of new rules where there was a significant likelihood that they would
result in reversal of a conviction. 94 The Court based its argument
on several considerations: 1) that the standard taken from Harlan's
test had no specific content; 2) that the Court has moved towards
relying on factual innocence as a requirement for habeas review;
and 3) that ensuring accuracy places an intelligible limit on the
scope of the second exception. 95
The Court concluded by holding that the fair cross section re-
quirement did not seriously diminish the likelihood of an accurate
conviction.96 Because he was undeserving of retroactive application
in general, the Court could not give Teague the benefit of the rule
without treating him differently than others in the same position.97
The threshold test of retroactivity thus foreclosed consideration of
the merits of Teague's constitutional claim.98
B. JUSTICE STEVENS'S DISSENT
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote an opinion
concurring in the plurality's judgment but finding fault with its
structural and substantive modifications ofJustice Harlan's retroac-
tivity doctrine. 99 First, Justice Stevens was unable to find any prece-
dent justifying the plurality's treatment of retroactivity as a
threshold test. 100 On the contrary, Justice Stevens observed that
under the conventional approach to determining whether proce-
dural error affected a defendant's conviction, the Court must decide
if an error occurred before ruling upon its effect on the convic-
tion. 1 1 He would extend the same reasoning to cases petitioning
for a new rule on collateral review. 0 2
Justice Stevens accepted the utility of the distinction between
93 Id. at 1076 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 694 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
94 Id. at 1076-77.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1077.
97 Id. at 1077-78.
98 Id. at 1078.
99 Id. at 1079 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
100 Id. at 1079 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
101 Id. at 1079 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
102 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens noted that his approach is not
inconsistent with the plurality's suggestion that new rules and the question of their ret-
roactive effect be decided in the same proceeding.
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direct and collateral review for preserving final decisions.' 0 3 He
also recognized the need for exceptions both for rules that protect
constitutional rights of private behavior and for procedural errors
that are fundamentally unfair.' 0 4 However, he could not accept the
plurality's interpretation of fundamental fairness. 10 5 Justice Stevens
asserted that Justice Harlan expressly rejected limiting the excep-
tion to cases where the conviction would likely be reversed when he
distanced himself from his earlier reliance on factfinding in Desist. 10 6
Justice Stevens questioned the practical value of using a standard of
factual innocence to "determine if a procedural change is suffi-
ciently 'bedrock' or 'watershed'" to affect the fundamental fairness
of a trial. 10 7
Instead, Justice Stevens would have looked to precedent to de-
termine if the rights guaranteed by a proposed rule have been re-
garded as fundamental. In this light, he concludes, there is no
question that claims of racial discrimination have been recognized
as serious matters implicating fundamental concerns of fair treat-
ment.'0 8 Despite his views, however, Justice Stevens felt con-
strained by the Court's decision in Allen v. Hardy to hold that claims
of racial discrimination in selection of a petit jury do not raise issues
of fundamental fairness. 10 9
C. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENT
Justice Brennan presented a broader, more vigorous attack on
the plurality's holding."10 First, in response to the plurality's asser-
tion that the purposes of habeas corpus are limited to deterrent ef-
fects, Justice Brennan argued that the courts have traditionally
extended the writ to its fullest possible jurisdiction to give petition-
ers every opportunity to contest the constitutionality of their cus-
tody."'1 He observed that only where procedural default occurs
have courts denied hearing of a petition." 12 In particular, Justice
103 Id. at 1080 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
104 Id. at 1080-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
105 Id. at 1081-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
106 Id. at 1080 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). See supra notes 57-62 and accompany-
ing text.
107 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1081 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
108 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
109 Id. at 1081-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
110 Id. at 1086 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition to contesting the substance of the
plurality's approach to retroactivity, Justice Brennan criticized the plurality for deciding
Teague's case without adequate briefing. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I I d. at 1084 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 1084-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
550-65 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320-24 (1979).
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Brennan noted, federal courts have been generous in granting
habeas petitions where defendants bringing claims of racial discrim-
ination in jury selection have exhausted state remedies. 113
In addition, Justice Brennan asserted that the plurality's con-
cern with the disparate treatment that results from denying retroac-
tivity to cases on direct review should apply equally to cases on
collateral review. The timing of the Court's decision to accept certi-
orari, he argued, has a random impact on the defendants in both
situations. 114
Justice Brennan next criticized the plurality for departing from
tradition by broadly defining a "new rule" subject to the retroactiv-
ity doctrine as one not dictated by precedent.' 15 He then cited a list
of cases where the Court had decided key constitutional issues even
though they neither raised questions about the accuracy of the de-
fendant's conviction nor followed necessarily from precedent. 116
He noted that some questions suggesting the need for new constitu-
tional rules are considered most often on collateral review. In such
cases, the plurality's approach leaves the Court to withhold new
doctrine it realizes to be constitutional until a defendant brings a
case on direct review." 17
Finally, Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Stevens that the
plurality misconstrued the proper scope of the second exception to
Justice Harlan's general rule against retroactivity in collateral re-
view. 1 8 According to Justice Brennan, the plurality's opinion ig-
nores an especially insidious form of fundamental injustice' 19 in
creating a standard based solely on the accuracy of conviction. Jus-
113 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1085 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 1085 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254
(1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)
(state prisoners alleging discrimination in selection of grand and petit juries entitled to
federal review of claims).
11-5 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1087-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 1089 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987)
(case concerned a single cross-examination question about defendant's post-arrest si-
lence); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (rule barring psychiatrists who fail to warn
defendants that the results of an examination could be introduced at trial from appear-
ing as witnesses).
I17 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1090 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 1093 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying
text.
19 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1093 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"It is obvious that discriminatory exclusion of Negroes from a trial jury does, or at
least may, prejudice a Negro's right to a fair trial, and that a conviction so obtained
should not stand. The trial jury hears the evidence of both sides and chooses what
it will believe. In so deciding, it is influenced by imponderables-unconscious and
conscious prejudices and preferences-and a thousand things we cannot detect or
isolate in its verdict and whose influence we cannot weigh."
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tice Brennan stated that the Court has consistently accorded allega-
tions of racial discrimination during trial the most serious and
careful scrutiny. In fact, Justice Brennan asserts, the Court has gone
so far as to refuse to apply harmless-error review where a habeas
petition alleges intentional discrimination. 120 In Justice Brennan's
view, the issue of discrimination strikes at the heart of fundamental
fairness and should be excepted from the plurality's test.
V. ANALYSIS
Expressing its frustration with the inconsistent results of the
Linkletter standard, the Teague plurality made a clean break with that
precedent in an attempt to establish a more coherent and workable
test for the retroactivity doctrine. The brief case history cited by the
plurality, as well as the summary presented above, testifies to the
legitimacy of its concern that the rule-based factors of the Linkletter
standard do not provide significant judicial guidance and free courts
to ignore important considerations of finality. 12 1 In light of the in-
consistent application of the previous retroactivity doctrine, the plu-
rality's rigid standard has potential significance for its deterrent
effects on criminal violations and for the conservation of limited ju-
dicial resources. 122
Nevertheless, the plurality opinion attributes false theoretical
significance to the concept of finality by mischaracterizing the na-
ture and purpose of collateral review. As this analysis will show, the
preservation of final decisions is a pragmatic interest that does not
rest on a clear theoretical distinction between the purposes of direct
and collateral review. No theoretical standard of partial retroactivity
can completely avoid the injustice inherent in selecting a cutoff
point for the application of new rules to prior events. 123 Thus,
Id. at 1093 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 301-02
(1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
120 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262 (1986)).
121 Id. at 1074.
122 The judicial and scholarly debate surrounding the extent to which retroactive ap-
plication of new rules would disturb prior convictions or burden courts has consistently
taken place on an abstract level with limited statistical support. See, e.g., Solem v.
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (cited by the
Teague plurality in support of claim that retroactivity overburdens judicial resources);
Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHi. L.
REv. 719, 745-47 (1966).
123 Critics of the general concept of retroactivity have argued that a rule of pure pros-
pectivity (where even the defendant in the case announcing the rule is denied its bene-
fits) would eliminate the dissimilar treatment accorded similarly situated defendants
under partial retroactivity. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Propo-
sal, 61 VA. L. REv. 1557 (1975). While pure prospectivity may pose additional
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whether the Court pursues its previous course or draws a line be-
tween direct and collateral review, it will accord different treatment
to defendants in similar positions.
Once the veil of theoretical justification is removed, the func-
tional character of the plurality's test demands that its practical ef-
fects be examined more closely. Thus, the exceptions to the
plurality test should account for the injustice of dissimilar treatment
by seeking to mitigate its effects where fundamental societal values
are implicated. Contrary to the plurality's contention, both prece-
dent and logic are capable of supplying a coherent definition of fun-
damental justice-especially where the likelihood of racial
discrimination during trial is significant. Not only has the Court rec-
ognized the fundamental nature of the right to be free from discrim-
ination, 124 but it is difficult to determine whether a violation of such
rights during trial were in any sense harmless or separable. The
plurality's standard ignores these difficulties by creating a presump-
tion that such violations did not affect the outcome. In its place, this
Note proposes a test that respects the practical interest in preserv-
ing finality while expanding the second exception to the Harlan
test 2 5 to account for these fundamental rights.
A. A BALANCED APPROACH TO RETROACTIVITY
1. The Inadequacy of the Linkletter Rule
The Teague plurality cited as its primary motivation for reformu-
lating the retroactivity doctrine the inconsistent and unfair results
produced by the Linkletter rule. 12 6 It would be difficult to dispute the
legitimacy of this concern. In a preface to its holding of a new retro-
activity approach, the plurality observed that the Court has at vari-
ous times retroactively applied new rules to cases on direct review,
denied retroactive application of rules to all cases still on direct re-
view except for the case announcing the rules, and limited new rules
to purely prospective application. 27 These cases amply demon-
strate the realization of Justice Harlan's fear that the balancing test
problems-the facts of cases immediately before them and pre-existing principles of law
have traditionally acted as constraints on judicial action-this Note must recognize the
Court's holding in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), that new criminal proce-
dural rules apply to cases still on direct review.
124 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1085 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the principles and
exceptions to the standard suggested by Justice Harlan.
126 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070-71.
127 Id. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) for
examples of the variations in the Court's previous approaches. See also supra notes 43-48
and accompanying text.
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of Linkletter would permit the Court to "fish[] one case from the
stream of appellate review, use[] it as a vehicle for pronouncing con-
stitutional standards, and then permit[] a stream Of similar cases
subsequently to flow by."1 28 With the test's vague emphasis on the
purpose of rules, the relative procedural position of defendants sel-
dom entered into the calculus of courts applying the Linkletter
doctrine.
Moreover, this inconsistency of application on the procedural
level has not been an unavoidable result of the attainment of a co-
herent policy on the nature and effect of the rules granted retroac-
tive effect. Rather, courts have remained free to manipulate the
three Linkletter factors to achieve inconsistent or even opposite re-
sults. One notable example is the discrepancy between the result in
Witherspoon v. Illinois,1 29 in which a new jury selection rule was given
full retroactive effect because it went to the heart of the fact-finding
process, and that in Daniel v. Louisiana,13 0 where retroactive applica-
tion of a rule barring systematic exclusion of women from juries was
denied to the defendant on the ground that it was not integral to
that process. Such contradictory outcomes reveal that the loss of
procedural consistency has not been offset by greater doctrinal
unity.
This lack of procedural or doctrinal consistency underscores
the need for a standard providing some assurance that parties
whose offenses and trials occur at almost the same time will be in a
similar position with respect to receiving the benefit of new constitu-
tional criminal procedures. The direct/collateral review distinction
fulfills this need for a rough temporal dividing line because direct
review takes place within a relatively discrete period of time. 3 1
The plurality's approach reflects recognition of this practical
need. Yet the plurality sought to prevent the inconsistencies of
Linkletter by greatly restricting the scope of the second exception
and by rigidly adhering to the direct/collateral review distinction
described by Justice Harlan.' 3 2 While providing a useful dividing
line for the purposes of finality, this test only complicates the retro-
activity picture by ignoring well-established Court precedent con-
cerning both the purposes of collateral review 3 3 and the
128 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
129 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
130 420 U.S. 31 (1975).
131 Beytagh, supra note 123, at 1601.
132 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
133 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-402 (1962) (main purpose of habeas corpus is to
prevent wrongful imprisonment of individual defendants); see also Mishkin, Foreword: The
High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 87 (1965).
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fundamental importance of preventing the subtle effects of racial
discrimination. 134 The remainder of this Note will explore the dan-
gers posed by this approach and will suggest a fairer and more flexi-
ble alternative.
2. The Inadequacy of the Plurality Approach: Habeas Corpus and the
Nature of Finality
The plurality defended its move from the Linkletter standard to a
test based on the procedural position of defendants on the basis of
an alleged distinction between the purposes of direct and collateral
review. 135 It quoted approvingly (though incorrectly) language
from Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Desist that seems to as-
sert a shift in the purposes of judicial review once an appeal has
become final. 136 In contrast to direct review, which aims at resolu-
tion of individual cases, the plurality implied that the primary goal
of collateral review is to monitor the behavior ofjudges in applying
constitutional rules.' 3 7 The plurality argued that, so long as the
lower court properly applied then-current constitutional law, the in-
terest in finality must take priority because the federal court is no
longer primarily concerned with the fate of individual defend-
ants. 138 In short, the plurality argued that the focus of the Court's
inquiry with respect to collateral review has shifted completely away
from providing individual relief to deterrence of judicial departure
from established norms. Upon this finding, Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that the Court must accord equal weight to the state's inter-
est in preserving final decisions, including respecting judicial
reliance on the previous rule and minimizing the number of
retrials. 13 9
134 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1986) (emphasizing the "Court's
unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination" during jury selection); Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979).
135 Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1073 (1989). See supra notes 84-88 and accompa-
nying text.
136 Id. The plurality omitted the word "additional" that appeared prior to the "incen-
tive" created by habeas corpus for courts to adhere to constitutional standards, as well
as the phrase "in these cases" that limited the incentive purpose of habeas corpus to a
subset of all cases heard on collateral review. Id.
137 Id. While not stating that habeas corpus serves only this purpose, Justice
O'Connor depicts the writ as giving nearly full weight to concerns for finality where they
are pressing. Id. at 1074. To remain consistent, the plurality cannot concede to habeas
corpus a primary purpose of providing individual relief because this would merely re-
create a Linklelter-type balancing test between purpose and effect that it attacked as un-
workable. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
138 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073-74.
139 Id. at 1074. To support its contention that interests in finality should be accorded
equal weight in determining the availability of habeas review, the plurality relied on a
1146 [Vol. 80
1990] RETROACTIVITY AND COLLATERAL REVIEW
The theoretical structure that the plurality constructed to assert
the priority of finality ultimately collapses in the absence of any sub-
stantive content. First, the Court's assertion that finality has consist-
ently been a counter-balancing factor in habeas corpus analysis 140
ignores its dependent, functional purpose. As one commentator
observed over twenty years ago, the finality of a judicial decision
results from a pragmatic policy decision to vest final authority in a
particular institution.' 4 ' That institution will exercise final authority
when it is felt that its review of the merits will combine with guaran-
tees of constitutional rights to ensure a certain likelihood that the
determination of guilt is accurate. 142 Even decisions of the Supreme
Court are not final by nature, but only because we as a society have
decided that the need to conserve judicial resources and to enforce
convictions outweighs the need to continue review any further.
Therefore, a court possessing final authority must conform to
accepted standards of review in order to justify use of that power.
The exercise of final authority is legitimate only if the steps leading
up to it have not been tainted by error. Consequently, an institu-
tion's exercise of final authority is not binding and need not be
respected when it fails to exercise that authority according to consti-
tutional standards of procedure. This conclusion implies that no
pragmatic standard of finality can safely ignore the process of
weighing the purpose and effects of new constitutional rulings im-
plicit in habeas corpus analysis. Rather, the importance of finality is
itself dependent upon the integrity of the prior review process.
A more thorough analysis of the history and principle underly-
ing the use of habeas corpus reveals that it cannot be reduced to the
single purpose of regulating the behavior ofjudges. The plurality's
conclusion that finality necessarily follows from a clear distinction
between direct and collateral review is untenable in light of the pur-
poses of habeas corpus expressed in federal statute and in case law.
The statute empowering federal courts to hear cases on habeas
corpus does not limit its objective to correcting the behavior of
civil case. Id. (citing Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940)). The plurality defended its extension of this precedent to the criminal context
largely on the basis of the second and third Linkletter factors-the administrative burden
of reopening cases and the justified reliance ofjudges on prior law. The plurality thus
conceded that the justifications for finality are in reality more practical than theoretical.
Id. at 1074-75.
140 Id. at 1073-74.
141 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 441, 444-53 (1963).
142 Id. at 447.
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judges.14 3 Rather, it sets forth the conditions under which a defend-
ant may seek relief in federal courts from any illegal and unconstitu-
tional imprisonment. 144 In addition, the most comprehensive
review of the purposes of habeas corpus undertaken by the Supreme
Court expressly recognized that habeas corpus serves as an impor-
tant means of individual relief.' 45 Thus, the plurality cannot cor-
rectly attribute a primary purpose of judicial deterrence to habeas
corpus. More importantly, it cannot claim that finality takes priority
in properly conducted collateral proceedings "by default" because
habeas corpus still operates to afford relief to individual defendants.
Instead, the pragmatic desire to preserve a final decision must re-
main dependent on the purpose of habeas corpus to prevent uncon-
stitutional detention.
3. Habeas Corpus and the Trial Process
The foregoing discussion returns us to the inquiry into the
threshold point at which federal courts are justified in granting
habeas corpus to overcome constitutional error. The federal habeas
corpus statute provides guidelines for determining when federal in-
tervention in state custody questions is justified. 146 The statute re-
quires that federal courts respect competent state determinations
resulting in custody except where the factfinding procedure, devel-
opment of facts, or other error denied a defendant a fair hearing of
his or her case at trial. 147 Thus, habeas corpus review primarily fo-
cuses on errors that threaten the integrity of the trial process. This
limited power of review is appropriate when one considers that state
courts, or any court hearing a case on direct review, are not inher-
ently more or less capable of applying the correct law than the fed-
eral court exercising habeas jurisdiction. 148 But when procedural
violations that irreversibly affect the hearing of evidence occur dur-
ing the course of a trial, the federal court is empowered to intervene
to ensure a fair review of the facts. 149
143 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1988). See supra note 20 for the text of the statute.
144 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988). See supra note 20.
145 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 412 (1963). Strangely, the plurality quoted the Fay
Court's observation that the development of habeas corpus has included " 'some back-
ing and filling,"' Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1074 (1989) (quotingFay, 372 U.S. at
412), without observing the Court's conclusion that this erratic growth has not changed
the basic fact that "the historic office of the Great Writ [has been] to redress detentions
in violation of fundamental law." Fay, 372 U.S. at 412.
146 See supra note 20.
147 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2),(3),(7) (1988). See supra note 20 for the text of the statute.
148 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 141, at 504.
149 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2),(3),(7) (1988); see supra note 20; see also Bator, supra note
141, at 502.
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Thus, the purpose of collateral review that emerges from this
analysis extends significantly beyond ensuring that trial courts "con-
duct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established con-
stitutional principles." 150 The statute does not look simply to the
propriety of the trial court's behavior at the time of trial, an issue
better left to a determination of the justified reliance by the court on
the previous rule.15 ' Instead, it focuses more broadly on whether a
defendant was afforded a fair opportunity to have the facts of his
case presented and considered fairly. 152 The Court's grant of
habeas review despite the absence of court error in one case' 53 re-
flects this intention to curb all procedural obstacles to an accurate
conviction, not simply errors committed by the court.
The rationale for granting habeas review to cases where the
state trial process threatens to distort the outcome should apply
with equal force in cases involving the retroactive application of
rules announced after a decision has become final. The foregoing
analysis has established that the plurality's distinction between the
purposes of direct and collateral review is illusory. Habeas corpus
serves to redress individual claims of wrongful custody in cases
where there is a possibility that the trial process itself has been dis-
torted by procedural error.154 Where a new rule directly implicates
the integrity of the trial process conducted under the former rule, it
necessarily raises doubts about the accuracy of the conviction.
Given that habeas serves as an important means of individual re-
lief,155 the plurality's assertion that the outmoded rule was in some
sense correct at the time of trial, but is not any longer, ignores the
thrust of the availability of collateral review.
A rule of retroactivity for constitutional holdings that correct
procedural errors occurring at trial would avoid the problems nor-
mally associated with a general policy of retroactive application.
First, there is no objective basis for the claim that a defendant bring-
ing a collateral claim because his trial or appeal was tainted by an
alleged error, later confirmed by the Court, is undeserving of the
new rule. When such a fundamental, pervasive rule is announced,
the Court is expressly recognizing that the former standard was not
simply inadequate but unfair. While the Court should not make
150 Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1073 (1989).
151 See supra note 20 for the text of the statute.
152 Id.
153 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (Court granted collateral review of claim of co-
erced confession even where defendant did not claim lower court error). See supra note
133 for a description of Fay.
154 See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 143-45.
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apologies for not having reached the new rule sooner, it should rec-
ognize that a defendant on collateral review may justifiably feel
cheated for not sharing in the benefit of the rule.
More importantly, the situation described avoids the possibility
that valid convictions would be reversed on legal technicalities.
This concern compelled Justice Harlan, the originator of the di-
rect/collateral review distinction, to reconsider his earlier reliance
on "factfinding" to define the second exception.' 56 Justice Harlan
backed away from the emphasis on any constitutional rule affecting
factfinding for three reasons. First, he feared the possibility that a
defendant convicted on the basis of other compelling evidence
could be freed through application of a procedural rule that has a
minimal impact on the factfinding process in his or her particular
case. 157 This possibility arises when probative evidence is obtained
or processed through illegal means. Whenever there is a possibility
that the trial process itself was affected by a procedural error-as
when the jury may be racially biased against the defendant-none of
the evidence remains untainted by the possibility of error.' 58 Sec-
ond, Justice Harlan suspected that the "truth-determining" test
would invite courts to undertake an independent adjudication on
the merits of a defendant's case in violation of the purpose of
habeas corpus.' 59 In this regard, it has been noted that a new rule
implicating the fundamental fairness of the trial process itself enti-
tles a defendant to individual relief under collateral review regard-
less of the merits of his case. 160 Finally, Justice Harlan feared that
factfinding rules may not be readily distinguishable from other
rules. However, this fear does not apply to situations where a new
rule is intended to alter the basic structure of the trial process rather
than affect a particular aspect of the trial.
In sum, expansion of the second exception to include retroac-
tive application of new rules implicating the integrity of the trial
process does not offend our traditional justifications for respecting
156 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 694 (1971). See supra notes 60-62 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Harlan's second exception.
157 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694-95.
158 Rules aimed at correcting perceived distortions occurring during trial differ from
rules that correct errors made prior to trial in this respect. For example, fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rules often affect only part of the evidence introduced at trial. If the
exclusion leaves intact evidence sufficient for conviction, the appellate court is justified
in respecting the lower court decision. See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643-44
(1984); see also Desist v. United States, 422 U.S. 244 (1969) (Court held that fourth
amendment exclusionary rule did not affect the reliability of the trial process).
159 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694.
160 See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
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the finality of decisions while conforming to the established pur-
poses of habeas corpus review.
Significantly, an exception that focuses on the integrity of the
trial process possesses two key advantages over the plurality's "ac-
curacy of the conviction" standard. First, the "trial process" ap-
proach allows an exception from non-retroactivity to defendants
seeking redress under a new rule for fundamental but insidious pro-
cedural errors whose effect would be nearly impossible to establish
under the "accuracy of the conviction" standard. Teague's case
highlights one of those difficult areas-race discrimination. Under
the plurality test, Teague is asked to prove that a theoretical jury
containing more black members would have reached a different ver-
dict on the same facts.1 61 The Court dismissed the possibility that
such a change would likely have any difference on the finding of
guilt.' 62 This is due, of course, to the reality that much race discrim-
ination operates on a subtle and unconscious level.' 63 The effect is
to deny actual victims of a potent force any realistic opportunity to
win retroactive application of rules that are designed to reduce
discrimination.
On the other hand, the trial process test recognizes that defend-
ants in this and similar situations are at a marked disadvantage. The
test would grant retroactivity to rules that address an evil that has
pervaded the entire trial process. In addition, the trial process rule
would be more consistent with precedent recognizing that a pro-
posed new rule may implicate questions of fundamental fairness
without necessarily affecting the verdict. 64 In his dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Brennan noted several decisions finding issues of funda-
mental fairness to be involved where discrimination threatens the
balanced composition of the jury, irrespective of a showing that the
racially balanced jury would have reached a different conclusion.1 65
161 Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1077 (1989).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1093 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 301-02
(1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
164 Justice Harlan expressly recognized that the Court has never defined fundamental
fairness in terms of the outcome of a particular trial. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693. In pro-
posing a Palko-type inquiry into rules "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'"
Justice Harlan looked to the nature of the rule involved and ignored the question of the
accuracy of the immediate conviction. Id. at 693-95 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); see also Beytagh, supra note 123, at 1598.
165 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1093 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545 (1979). One such precedent even recognized that the fundamental fairness of
trial was jeopardized by a racially imbalanced grand jury. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254 (1986). A racial imbalance in the petit jury, of course, more directly affects the fair
presentation and consideration of evidence.
1151
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Certainly the urgency of this problem does not diminish simply be-
cause it is brought before the court on collateral review.:
B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RETROACTIVITY INQUIRY
The difficulties of the plurality opinion are not limited to the
operation of the proposed test. By radically changing the focus of
the retroactivity test and by requiring that it be decided as a thresh-
old question, 166 the plurality has severely impaired its own ability to
assess carefully and thoroughly the full importance of proposed
rules. Under the Linkletter doctrine, the focus of any inquiry fell first
on the purpose of the proposed rule.167 Whether or not retroactiv-
ity was granted consistently in all cases, courts were at least forced
to examine the nature of a rule, its intended and actual effects, and
its similarities to existing rules. One advantage of this "rule first"
approach was the safeguard of determining if the rule was really so
new as to justify use of the retroactivity doctrine at all.
Prior to Teague, courts also usually decided the retroactivity
question after the new rule had been debated and shaped in the
opinion announcing the rule. 168 This practice provided additional
protection against making decisions based on inadequate informa-
tion about the "new" rule. This was true whether the retroactivity
of a new rule was decided in the same proceeding announcing the
rule or in a later case.
The plurality's radical restructuring removes both of these re-
straints on uninformed decisionmaking. Instead, the plurality
would have the Court determine if a proposed rile is new at the
outset, then focus on the procedural positions of the parties to de-
termine whether an unexplored rule deserved retroactive applica-
tion. 169 Its approach creates two difficulties. First, it is often
unclear whether a proposed rule is "new," or whether it is a neces-
sary corollary of an established rule. For instance, the application of
the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury could arguably be
necessary to implement the rationale of the requirement. The plu-
rality's failure to give thorough treatment to this issue-it defined a
"new rule" as any holding not demanded by precedent' 7 0-must
raise questions about the depth of the Court's understanding of the
principles involved in its inquiry.
Second, the plurality approach allows courts to dismiss issues of
166 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069.
167 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
168 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069.
169 Id. at 1069-70.
170 Id. at 1070.
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fundamental fairness on the basis of a procedural distinction with-
out further study. The rule endorsed by the plurality permits dispo-
sition of cases raising important issues without ensuring adequate
investigation of the nature and substantive impact of such issues,
and encourages courts to shun their responsibilities under tradi-
tional habeas corpus doctrine.' 71 If a court were to find on closer
look that the rule simply modifies or marginally extends an existing
rule, it would have failed to apply current law. In contrast, framing
the second exception to Justice Harlan's test in terms of its effects
on the trial process forces courts to conduct at least a preliminary
inquiry into the nature and effects of the proposed rule.
This additional change made by the plurality without extensive
discussion can thus be seen to work a significant and potentially
harmful effect. The plurality's approach would restructure retroac-
tivity to eliminate the necessity for a sound and principled analysis
of proposed rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
In shaping its new retroactivity doctrine, the Teague plurality
sought to avoid the need for an inquiry into the purposes of pro-
posed new rules, which it blamed for the inconsistent results
achieved under the Linkletter standard. This analysis has shown that
the Court cannot avoid examining the purpose and effects of pro-
posed new rules in shaping its retroactivity doctrine. While the
Court may make a practical distinction between cases heard on di-
rect and collateral review to further its stated interest in finality, it
should not do so at the expense of established principles of funda-
mental fairness that ensure the integrity of the trial process itself.
While this approach lacks the attractive theoretical neatness of the
plurality's test, it would compel the federal courts to grant defend-
ants on collateral review an opportunity for review of their cases
free from distortion in its subtle as well as overt forms.
ROGER D. BRANIGIN III
171 Id. at 1088 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1153
